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BEYOND THE TORTURE MEMOS: PERCEPTUAL FILTERS, CULTURAL
COMMITMENTS, AND PARTISAN IDENTITY
Cassandra Burke Robertson *
Efforts to hold the torture memo authors professionally accountable for
their advice will face two difficulties. First, it will likely be difficult to prove
that the memos were written in bad faith. While legal scholars and other
lawyers agree nearly universally that the memos represent bad legal advice,
bad advice does not necessarily equate to bad-faith advice. The existence of
perceptual filters and deep partisan identification may have shaped the
lawyers' views of the situation in ways that appear unfathomable to outsid-
ers. Second, even if the Office of Professional Responsibility finds evidence
of professional misconduct, there is a risk that efforts to hold the memo
authors accountable will lack widespread political support, as onlookers
view such efforts through their own perceptual frameworks and partisan
commitments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Who should face accountability for the mistreatment of prisoners in
the war on terror? Five years ago, the scope of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib
was first revealed; this year, the Justice Department admitted that a single
suspect was waterboarded one hundred and eighty-three times.1 Some at the
bottom of the political hierarchy have already been convicted for their par-
ticipation in prisoner abuse. 2 Those closer to the top of the political hie-
rarchy also find their actions subject to scrutiny, as the Department of Jus-
tice's Office of Professional Responsibility is carrying out an investigation
into the professional conduct of the lawyers who authored the memos per-
mitting "enhanced interrogation."
3
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Scott Shane, Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2 Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, April 19,
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2 See David S. Cloud, Private Gets 3 Years for Iraq Prison Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2005, at A20.
3 David Johnston & Scott Shane, Interrogation Memos: Inquiry Suggests No Charges,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2009, at Al ("The report by the Office of Professional Responsibility, an
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This article argues that efforts to hold the memo authors professio-
nally accountable for their advice will face two difficulties. First, it will
likely be difficult to prove that the memos were written in bad faith. While
legal scholars and other lawyers agree nearly universally that the memos
represent bad legal advice, bad advice does not necessarily equate to bad-
faith advice. The existence of perceptual filters and deep partisan identifica-
tion may have shaped the lawyers' views of the situation in ways that ap-
pear unfathomable to outsiders.4 Second, even if the Office of Professional
Responsibility finds evidence of professional misconduct, there is a risk that
efforts to hold the memo authors accountable will lack widespread support,
as those efforts may be viewed by partisan opponents as lacking political
legitimacy.' Onlookers will also view such efforts through their own per-
ceptual frameworks and partisan commitments, and may therefore not agree
that the memo authors' conduct deserves to be punished. In particular, this
article argues that between 2005 and 2009 there was a redefinition of cul-
tural commitments associated with partisan identity. In 2004 there was still
a broad anti-torture American identity, but that identity became fragmented
by 2008, with support for torture breaking along partisan lines. In time, cul-
tural commitments may again shift to allow a united American identity that
condemns torture. Until that happens, however, it is likely that accountabili-
ty efforts will further entrench partisan animosity.
II. THE TORTURE MEMOS
The conventional narrative of the torture memos is that they
represent the worst sort of venality-that the lawyers in the Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) were willing to sacrifice professional ideals of indepen-
dence in favor of providing legal cover to blatantly illegal acts that the Bush
administration wished to undertake. 6 Legal complaints center around two
areas: the weak legal analysis of the Yoo/Bybee memo that was later with-
to consider possible disciplinary action, which could include reprimands or even disbarment,
for some of the lawyers involved in writing the legal opinions, the officials said.").
4 See infra Part III.
5 See infra Part IV.
6 See Posting of Brian Tamanaha to Balkinization Blog, Reasons to Infer That the OLC
Torture Memos Were Not Issued in "Good Faith", http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/04/how-
we-know-that-olc-torture-memos-were.html (Apr. 22 2009 12:51); Jordan J. Paust, Executive
Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interroga-
tion of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811 (2005). See also Jesselyn Radack, Tor-
tured Legal Ethics: The Role of the Government Advisor in the War on Terrorism, 77 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1 (2006); Stephen Gillers, Tortured Reasoning, AM. LAW., July 1, 2004; Julie
Angell, Comment, Ethics, Torture, and Marginal Memoranda at the DOJ Office of Legal
Counsel, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmIcs 557 (2005); Marisa Lopez, Note, Professional Responsi-
bility: Tortured Independence in the Office of Legal Counsel, 57 FLA. L. REv. 685 (2005).
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drawn, and the lack of factual support for other memos authorizing specific
techniques. Moral complaints suggest that the lawyers were complicit in a
policy of torture and abuse.7
There is little debate that the withdrawn memo's legal analysis is
extraordinarily weak-its analysis was "widely regarded as preposterous," 8
even spectacularly bizarre. 9 The memo was criticized for defining torture
"by lifting language from a Medicare statute on medical emergencies," "ig-
nor[ing] inconvenient Supreme Court precedents," and "flatly misrepre-
sent[ing] what sources said."' 0 It was described as "almost a parody of tex-
tualism, in which words alone are considered, having no regard for the con-
text of their usage."' 1 Because the analysis was so bad, many assumed that
the memo was written in bad faith: "One of these expectations is that the
law will be interpreted in good faith, with an eye toward recovering the
substantive meaning of a statute, treaty, or line of cases. Violating this ex-
pectation is the essence of the unethical conduct of lawyers like Yoo and
Bybee."'
12
Other memos, which gave a more detailed authorization of specific
interrogation techniques, were criticized for their lack of factual support
rather than deficiencies in legal analysis. 13 In one case, the CIA had asked
for an opinion as to whether specific interrogation practices such as sleep
deprivation, waterboarding, stress positions, and related techniques could be
legally undertaken. 14 The OLC agreed on the legal standard: the techniques
were impermissible if they were "specifically intended to inflict severe
physical or mental pain or suffering ... ."" The OLC did not analyze
7 See, e.g., David Swanson, Torture Probe: Who's Being Protected Under the Searing
Bright Light?, HUMANIST, July-August 2009, available at http://www.thehumanist.org/
humanist/09jul aug/Swanson.html.
8 David Luban, Torture and the Professions, 26 CRIM. JUST. ETHICs 2, 58-59 (2007).
9 See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 159, 177-79 (2007). See also
W. Bradley Wendel, Executive Branch Lawyers in a Time of Terror: 2008 F. W. Wickwire
Memorial Lecture, 31 DALHOUSIE L.J. 247, 265 (2008) ("In this case, the arguments relied
upon by the Bush administration lawyers are so far outside the range of reasonable that it is
impossible to take them seriously. That is the basis for concluding that these lawyers acted
unethically.").
10 Luban, supra note 8, at 59.
11 W. Bradley Wendel, Deference to Clients and Obedience to Law: The Ethics of the
Torture Lawyers (A Response To Professor Hatfield), 104 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 58, 69
(2009).
12 Id. at 70.
13 See Tamanaha, supra note 6.
14 Id.
15 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2006). See generally Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General
Counsel (May 10, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/techniques.pdf
(last visited Nov. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Bradbury Memo].
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whether such techniques would be reasonably viewed as inflicting such
pain. Instead, as critics point out, the OLC memos defer to the CIA's assur-
ance that their use of such techniques was not intended to cause severe pain
or suffering. The memo accepted as a factual predicate that detainees would
be "evaluated by medical and psychological professionals" who would en-
sure that "the detainee's physical condition [was] such that these interven-
tions would not have lasting effect, and his psychological state [was] strong
enough that no severe psychological harm would result." 16 Once that factual
predicate was accepted, it was a short step to the legal conclusion that the
techniques were not specifically intended to cause severe pain or suffering.
The memos did not analyze whether outsiders would view such assurances
as reasonable in light of what was known about the effects of such
techniques.
Professor Brian Tamanaha finds this factual acceptance to violate
the lawyer's duty, concluding that the OLC:
[I]ssued a legal opinion sanctioning the legality of these interrogation
practices based entirely upon the promise of the potential criminal suspects
that they would not violate the law when engaging in these practices....
[T]here was no independent or reliable factual basis to support the legal
opinion. Without such a factual basis, the legal opinion simply could not
be issued in good faith. 17
III. PERCEPTUAL FILTERS
But does either bad legal analysis or reliance on self-serving factual
assumptions necessarily equate to bad-faith legal practice? In a recent ar-
ticle, 18 I argued that cognitive bias and associated blind spots may better
explain such lapses. Both the unsupported legal claims of the Yoo/Bybee
memo and the reliance of the "techniques memo" on the CIA's own self-
serving assessment seem to fit in with classic bias blind spot research. 19 If
the memo authors were trying to provide legal cover for a pre-ordained re-
sult, they did a very bad job of it-if the lawyers truly acted in bad faith,
why would they not manufacture the appearance of more reliable data, ra-
ther than openly relying on self-serving assessments? It seems more likely
that the authors were simply blind to how the rest of the world would view
their analysis, and that they never thought to question the accuracy or relia-
16 Bradbury Memo, supra note 15, at 6.
17 Tamanaha, supra note 6.
18 See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L.
REv. 1 (2009), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&
context=cassandra-robertson.
19 Id.
[Vol. 42:389
BEYOND THE TORTURE MEMOS
bility of the CIA's assessment. If they saw no reason to question the accura-
cy of the CIA's assurances, they would not expect others to do so either.
Social scientists have long known that people interpret facts and
events in ways that conform to their prior expectations and allegiances. In
1954, a study of a Princeton-Dartmouth football game revealed that Prince-
ton and Dartmouth fans viewed the game very differently.2 ° Princeton fans
were more likely to notice Dartmouth rule infractions, and vice versa. Fans
were also likely to interpret those rule violations differently, believing that
the other team's infractions were more likely to have been intentional than
those of their own team. These differences in attention and interpretation
have been referred to as a "perceptual filter."'
'
Perceptual filters also exist in the political realm. A study of Bos-
nian Serb, Muslim, and neutral observers showed that each group viewed
media coverage of the 1994 Sarajevo market bombing very differently and
formed different conclusions about who was responsible for the bombing.
22
Other studies showed similar effects in U.S. Presidential election coverage
23
and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. 24 These differences are more than simply
differences of opinion-they are unconscious differences in perception,
unknown to the individuals involved, that cause individuals to differ both in
their perception of factual matters and their interpretation of those facts.25
Such perceptual filters were almost certainly at work in the Office
of Legal Counsel.2 6 Under the Bush administration, hiring was highly parti-
20 See Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954).
21 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA.
L. REv. 101, 108 (1997).
22 See Kimberly Matheson & Sanela Dursun, Social Identity Precursors to the Hostile
Media Phenomenon: Partisan Perceptions of Coverage of the Bosnian Conflict, 4 GROUP
PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 116, 123 (2001).
23 See Russell J. Dalton et al., Partisan Cues and the Media: Information Flows in the
1992 Presidential Election, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111 (1998).
24 See R.P. Vallone et al., The Hostile Media Phenomenon: Biased Perception and Per-
ceptions of Media Bias in Coverage of the Beirut Massacre, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 577 (1985).
25 For example, when one Dartmouth alumnus was unable to perceive the same infractions
that the Princeton alumni had told him about, he assumed that he had not been given the
whole film-it never occurred to him that he simply viewed the game differently than the
Princeton group. He sent the following telegram to the researchers: "Preview of Princeton
movies indicates considerable cutting of important part please wire explanation and possibly
air mail missing part before showing scheduled for January 25[.] [W]e have splicing equip-
ment." Hastorf & Cantril, supra note 20, at 132.
26 Such perceptual filters also affect moral judgment through "ethical fading," which is
defined as the "tendency to interpret the situation so that it does not implicate one's ethical or
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san.27 John Yoo, like many others in the administration, defined himself as a
partisan Republican who was keenly interested in the political success of his
party.28 This shared mindset likely made Yoo and others subject to the same
perceptual filters of the administration they served. A political opponent-
or even a neutral observer-would thus be more likely to see the weak-
nesses in the factual assumptions and legal analysis the memos contained. A
political sympathizer would be less likely to see those weaknesses, and
would therefore be more likely to give legal advice that the administration
viewed favorably, even without any deliberate attempt to subvert the law.
Thus, the perceptual filters created a type of "echo chamber" where dissent-
ing views were not just unaired, but were actually unseen and unknown.
IV. TORTURE AND POLITICAL IDENTITY
Perceptual filters cannot be cast aside easily; instead, they are deep-
ly embedded in individuals' identities. As noted in the prior section, sharing
commitments with others makes it more likely that perceptual filters will
also be shared: "[p]eople who share formative identities tend to apprehend
facts in a similar way in part because they are likely to be drawing on com-
mon life experiences when interpreting what various events signify. 29
These perceptual frameworks are not random. Rather, people "face strong
psychological pressure to fit their perceptions of how the world does work
to their shared appraisals of how the world should work" in order to avoid
dissonance and to protect their status within groups whose members share
their core values. 30
Thus, a person's political identity will affect not just his or her opi-
nions about relevant policy choices: it will also affect his or her perception
of the facts underlying those policy choices.31 In social psychology terms,
moral duties." Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience by Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons
from Social Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 451, 470 (2007).
27 See, e.g., Editorial, Contradiction: Washington Contrast, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (WV),
Apr. 9, 2009, available at http://wvgazette.com/Opinion/Editorials/200904090956.
28 See generally JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR
ON TERROR (2006).
29 Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in
'Acquaintance Rape' Cases 3 (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 196), available
at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1437742.
30 Id.
31 Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-
Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465 (2007) ("[I]ndividuals tend
to conform their view of the risks of putatively dangerous activities-commerce and tech-
nology, guns, abortion-to their cultural evaluations of them. Because individuals' identities
are threatened when they encounter information that challenges beliefs commonly held with-
in their group.. . , the result is political conflict over risk regulation among groups commit-
ted to opposing hierarchical and egalitarian, individualistic and communitarian
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people's identities consist of various roles and group memberships, each of
which has shared cultural and social meanings-thus, a person may be a
lawyer (a role identity), parent (another role identity), Republican (a group
identity), and an American (another group identity). When another's evalua-
tion of oneself is consistent with one's own self-conception, "self-
verification" is achieved.32 When another's appraisal is at odds with one's
own self-view, emotional distress will result. A person will either change
his or her behavior in order to obtain feedback from others that facilitates
self-verification, or the individual will adopt cognitive strategies to cope
with the inconsistency, such as selectively focusing on information that ap-
pears to confirm one's own self-view.33
A role identity and group identity are related by having meanings
that are held in common. 34 For example, the meaning of being a member of
the Republican party and a lawyer within the Republican administration
involved sharing the common meaning of "fighting terrorism." Administra-
tion lawyers verified this meaning in their identity by authorizing so-called
"enhanced interrogation"--but to do so, they unconsciously filtered contra-
dictory legal authority forbidding torture. Authorizing such techniques si-
multaneously verified their membership in the Republican party, as the ac-
tion approved of techniques desired by administration leaders.
Essentially, the role and group identities and the meanings held
within these identities (of the acceptability of torture in the fight against
terrorism) shaped the memo authors' perception and legal advice. This is
not unusual: a lawyer may often provide a client with a desired answer not
out of any conscious desire to bend the law in favor of the client, but rather
out of an unconscious filtering of information that causes the lawyer to fo-
cus more intently on favorable precedent while contrary authority goes un-
noticed. Filtering is especially likely when the lawyer is a "true believer" in
the client's cause, as John Yoo was; in such cases, both lawyer and client
are apt to overlook non-conforming feedback. 35 Thus, a lawyer might pro-
vide the answers the client desires not because of pressure or venality, but
worldviews."). See also Sheldon Stryker and Peter J. Burke, The Past, Present, and Future of
Identity Theory, 63 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 284, 286 (2000).
32 Jan E. Stets & Peter J. Burke, Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory, 63 Soc.
PSYCHOL. Q. 224, 225 (2000) ("In identity theory, the core of an identity is the categorization
of the self as an occupant of a role, and the incorporation, into the self, of the meanings and
expectations associated with that role and its performance.").
33 See Jan E. Stets & Alicia D. Cast, Resources and Identity Verification from an Identity
Theory Perspective, 50 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSP. 517, 522 (2007); William B. Swann, Jr., The
Trouble With Change: Self- Verification and Allegiance to the Self, 8 PSYCHOL. SCI. 177, 178
(1997).
34 Stets & Burke, supra note 32, at 228.
35 See Robertson, supra note 18.
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simply because of a limited perception of the facts. Public condemnation is
unlikely to change such behavior-approval from clients and other res-
pected individuals would verify the lawyer's self-conceptions, emotionally
vindicating the lawyer's actions even in the face of public disapproval.
The advice proffered by the memo authors was not-and could not
be-independent of allegiance to the groups in which they belonged. 36 Giv-
en this connection, the torture memos may have been much more a product
of one playing out a role (here, the lawyer) in a group (of the Republican
party) and engaging in perceptual filtering. This filtering process happens
unconsciously; unlike a calculated response to venality or outside pressure,
it may occur without any conscious awareness by the lawyer. Nevertheless,
the lawyers' advice simultaneously served both their role and group identi-
ty. By filtering out countervailing legal interpretations, the lawyers were
able to maintain a view of themselves as providing independent and compe-
tent advice. By offering advice that comported with the administration's
goals, they were able to verify the meaning of the Republican party-the
acceptability of torture.
But the problem of torture and political identity affected much more
than the lawyers: it also shaped the policy commitments of the American
public. Here, two group identities overlapped: an American identity that
condemned torture, and a Republican group identity that grew to support it.
As noted, people tend to view the world in a self-serving manner, allowing
them to protect their self-conceptions. Thus, when information about possi-
ble torture first entered the national consciousness after the Abu Ghraib
photographs were released, the initial American reaction was largely one of
denial.37 While the media in other countries was more likely to characterize
the abuse as systemic and reflective of larger U.S. policy decisions, the
American media was more likely to characterize it as the result of the im-
moral activities of a few "hillbilly kids," unrelated to larger policy objec-
tives. 3' The American identity condemned torture; therefore, when pre-
sented with activities that looked very much like torture, Americans viewed
36 Stets & Burke, supra note 32, at 228 ("[O]ne always and simultaneously occupies a role
and belongs to a group, so that role identities and social identities are always and simulta-
neously relevant to, and influential on, perceptions, affect, and behavior.").
37 See Timothy M. Jones & Penelope Sheets, Torture in the Eye of the Beholder: Social
Identity, News Coverage, andAbu Ghraib, 26 POL.CoMM. 278 (2009).
38 Robert N. Strassfeld, American Innocence, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 277, 305 (2006)
(noting that the focus on Charles Graner and Lynndie England reinforces the idea that "the
events at Abu Ghraib were aberrational and do not represent America" by portraying the
events as "the sadistic diversion of 'trailer trash."'). By focusing on England and Graner,
Americans could view the abuse without threat to their own identities: "Though the Ameri-
can faces in the Abu Ghraib pictures may look like ours, the representation of Graner and
England allows many Americans to use class, geography, lifestyle, and education to distance
themselves from torture and abuse." Id
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those actions as unusual, unauthorized, and essentially unrepresentative of
American policy.
39
What is even more troubling than such biased perception of torture,
however, is how the cultural meaning of torture and abuse changed over the
course of time. Initially, the American identity condemned a policy of tor-
ture-if it had not, there would have been no reason for Americans to perce-
ive the information from Abu Ghraib as mere isolated abuse, even in the
face of evidence suggesting otherwise. 40 But certain administration officials
publicly stated a desire to change that identity to one more accepting of
harsh tactics. Former Vice President Richard B. Cheney sent this message
less than a week after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, arguing that a national
identity that highly valued anti-torture policies might be ineffective to com-
bat national threats: "We also have to work through sort of the dark side, if
you will .... It is a mean, nasty, dangerous, dirty business out there, and we
have to operate in that arena."
41
Cheney's message did not succeed because it was inherently persu-
asive; rather, it did so because it was effective in changing the social mean-
ing of what it meant to be a Bush/Cheney Republican. Certainly, he sent a
message that we needed to torture to get information. The factual back-
ground to back up that assertion, however, was largely absent. 42 What lin-
guistics expert Deborah Tannen refers to as the "metamessage" in this case
was much more important than the message itself. She distinguishes be-
tween message and metamessage by pointing out that "[i]nformation con-
veyed by the meanings of words is the message," but "[w]hat is communi-
cated about relationships-attitudes towards each other, the occasion, and
what we are saying-is the metamessage. And it's metamessages that we
39 Jones & Sheets, supra note 37, at 290 (concluding that "a shared social identity in the
service of a positive national self-image . . . unites journalists and citizenry in interpreting
these events in nation-affirming ways.").
40 Id. (noting that "declassified official memos suggest that at least some of what took
place may have been official policy.").
41 CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE, GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE: SECRET GOVERNMENT, WAR
CRIMES, AND THE RULE OF LAW 5 (2009).
42 See Psychological Torture, CIA-Style, HARPER'S, Apr. 1997, at 23-24 ("Intense pain is
quite likely to produce false confessions, fabricated to avoid additional punishment. This
results in a time-consuming delay while an investigation is conducted and the admissions are
proven untrue."). See also Hearing on Standards of Military Commissions and Tribunals
Before the House Armed Services Comm. (July 26, 2006) (prepared statement of Michael P.
Scharf, Professor of Law and Director of the International Law Center at Case Western Re-
serve University School of Law), available at http:www.publicinternationallaw.
org/publications/testimony (last visited Nov. 4, 2009) (criticizing the testimony of Steven
Bradbury, acting Assistant Attorney General and head of the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel,
who authored the "techniques" memo of May 10); Michael P. Scharf, Tainted Provenance:
When, If Ever, Should Torture Evidence Be Admissible?, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 129
(2008).
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react to most strongly., 43 Here, the metamessage behind Cheney's stated
message was that this is who we are-that Americans, or at least those who
support his party, are willing, even eager to get their hands dirty, to work on
the "dark side."
Thus, Cheney was changing the cultural meaning of what it meant
to be a Bush/Cheney Republican. Those who had made the cultural com-
mitment to support the Bush/Cheney agenda more broadly were therefore
likely to accept a policy "doing whatever is necessary" and believing that
such "enhanced interrogations" were indeed necessary to combat terrorist
attacks. Such acceptance is consistent with recent research regarding cultur-
al commitments, which suggests that people accept or reject new informa-
tion based on the commitments they have already accepted.44 When people
had committed to the Bush/Cheney agenda, they were more likely to accept
this shift in commitment to "work through... the dark side."45
This shift in cultural meaning did not require people to define them-
selves in ways that were alien to their self-view, but instead built on pre-
existing components of the American identity. As other scholars have
pointed out, the American identity has more than one aspect: on the one
hand, it includes "freedom as a universal ideal" (and a view of the U.S. as
"'the patron' for a free global environment"), but it also includes a "focus
on strength [and] will" which carries a sense that appearing weak "would
excite not the desired respect, but only contempt., 46 Thus, the American
identity includes a cultural meaning of respect for human rights (as part of
its emphasis on freedom) and includes a cultural meaning of global authori-
ty, which requires the appearance of strength. When American strength ap-
peared to be challenged by the events of 9/11, some have suggested that
detainee abuse was a way of re-establishing the perceived strength of Amer-
ican power: "[f]rom this angle, the demonstration of US power through ab-
using detainees disciplines the world into a US global order .... 47 Thus,
accepting "enhanced interrogation" or torture required people to emphasize
the "authority" component of the American identity and de-emphasize the
"human rights" component, but it did not require wholesale change.
43 DEBORAH TANNEN, THAT'S NOT WHAT I MEANT: How CONVERSATIONAL STYLE MAKES
OR BREAKS YOUR RELATIONS WITH OTHERS 29 (1992).
44 Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 149, 151 (2006).
45 PYLE, supra note 41.
46 Brent J. Steele, 'Ideals that Were Really Never in Our Possession': Torture, Honor, and
US Identity, 22 INT'L REL. 243, 248 (2008), available at http://ire.sagepub.com/cgi/
reprint/22/2/243.pdf (quoting Jutta Weldes, The Cultural Production of Crises: U.S. Identity
and Missiles in Cuba, in CULTURES OF INSECURITY: STATES, COMMUNITIES AND THE
PRODUCTION OF DANGER 46 (J. Weldes et al. eds. 1992)).
47 Steele, supra note 46, at 251.
[Vol. 42:389
BEYOND THE TORTURE MEMOS
The strategy of re-defining partisan cultural commitment to include
a willingness to engage in "enhanced interrogation" worked stunningly
well. Between 2005 and 2009-a period of time well after the 9/11 at-
tacks-the percentage of Americans who "believed torture was at least
sometimes justifiable" rose from thirty-eight percent to fifty-two percent.48
Among Republicans as a whole, it was more than sixty-six percent.4 9
Among Democrats, however, the percentage was much smaller-
approximately thirty-three percent.50 Interestingly, sixty-two percent of
white, Protestant evangelical Christians agreed that torture could be justi-
fied, while only forty percent of the nonreligious agreed.51 It seems unlikely
that this disparity could be explained as a matter of religious doctrine; more
likely, it is an example of the type of cultural commitment described above.
Evangelical Christians were more likely to support the Bush/Cheney ticket
based on its social conservatism. When the cultural meaning ascribed to that
ticket expanded to include support for torture, those who had already com-
mitted their support to the ticket also committed to support their views on
torture. 1
2
By the time of the Republican primaries for the 2008 presidential
election, other Republican candidates also reflected this view. In a South
Carolina debate, all Republican presidential hopefuls but one "endors[ed]
the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, including waterboarding, to
uncover the proverbial ticking bomb" to "strong audience applause. 53 Only
John McCain objected to a re-definition of the American identity to include
torture, stating that his experience in Vietnam had convinced him that "[i]t's
not about the terrorists; it's about us. It's about what kind of country we
are."5 4 McCain's message was one that the audience was not ready to hear,
and audience members reacted with silence.
55
48 Sanctioning of Torture by Americans Betrays All We Stand for, BEAVER COUNTY TIMES
(Pa.), June 11, 2009.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Torture, Religion Should Not Go Hand-In-Hand, YORK DISPATCH (Pa.), June 10, 2009.
52 In the fall of 2009, t-shirts reading "I'd rather be waterboarding" were offered for sale
by Conservative T-Shirts.com, alongside other shirts stating "Proud Republican," "Jesus
Christ is a Personal Friend of Mine," and "Annoy a Liberal: Work Hard and Live Free." See
http://www.conservative-t-shirts.com/conservative-t-shirts/waterboarding-t-shirts.html (last
visited Nov. 4, 2009).
53 PYLE, supra note 41, at 152.
54 Id.
55 Id. Of course, McCain did win the Republican nomination. His victory in the primary
may suggest either that his position on torture was less important than other considerations,
or that the Republican voting public has a different position on torture than the audience,
who may have represented only the base of the party.
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY
Because torture itself has entered the partisan divide, any investiga-
tion into torture policies will necessarily be subject to partisan perceptual
frameworks as well. For an investigation to be successful, it would need to
begin with an understanding of what is legal and conclude with an agree-
ment about what actually happened. Unfortunately, both of those goals are
unlikely to be achieved. Due to the partisan divide that has been created
over the torture issue, as well as the differing perceptual frameworks, it is
unlikely that people will agree either on the legal question or the factual
one.
Furthermore, both sides question the motivations of the other.
Those who were involved in developing the interrogation policies believe
they are being unfairly targeted in a partisan witch-hunt. John Yoo, for ex-
ample, has characterized the Office of Professional Responsibility's investi-
gation into the torture memos as "a short-term political maneuver in re-
sponse to political criticism., 56 Similarly, Cheney has stated that he believes
the Obama administration's proposed investigation is "intensely partisan"--
that instead of appreciating the prior administration's efforts to keep the
country safe, the new administration is "out there now threatening to disbar
the lawyers who gave us the legal opinions. 57 On the other side, members
of the Center for Constitutional Rights argue that the memo authors them-
selves were the ones who manipulated the law for partisan ends:
Responsibility for the torture program cannot be laid at the feet of a few
low-level operatives. Some agents in the field may have gone further than
the limits so ghoulishly laid out by the lawyers who twisted the law to
create legal cover for the program, but it is the lawyers and the officials
who oversaw and approved the program who must be investigated.
58
Thus, any investigation undertaken by the current administration
will likely be viewed as legitimate only by those who already supported the
administration. Like the Serbs and Muslims reacting to the Sarajevo bomb-
ing, or even like the Princeton and Dartmouth fans watching a game, each
side is predisposed to focus on the faults of the other. Each side is also pre-
56 Yoo, supra note 28, at 183.
57 Sam Stein, Cheney Accuses Obama of Launching "Intensely Partisan" Torture Investi-
gation, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 30, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/30/
cheney-accuses-obama-of-ln272160.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2009) (quoting Dick Cheney
from a Fox News interview).
58 Holder-And Obama-Must Focus on Torture Accountability, CAPITAL TIMEs (Wi.),
August 27, 2009, available at http://host.madison.com/ct/news/opinion/editorial/article_
a428f29c- 1cOe-54e7-b 1 78-873fe3b00e48.html.
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disposed to impugn the motives of the other. These are not calculated views;
they operate at a deeply unconscious level. 5
Furthermore, studies show that even when individuals attempt to
look beyond their own partisan biases, they are unable to; those biases are
buried so deeply in the unconscious that they cannot be called up at will.
60
Attempts to overcome unconscious partisan biases may even backfire, as
asking people to focus on potential partisan biases can reinforce prior posi-
tions.61 When people put additional time and effort into thinking about the
conflict, they don't change the outcome; they believe they are "already be-
ing fair.",62 Thus, they simply put the extra time and effort into "supporting
the position they already favored, not on rethinking the position they disa-
greed with.",
63
The unconscious nature of such partisan commitments is especially
troubling for accountability efforts. It may be that the partisan commitment
to torture is currently weaker than other partisan commitments; people may
express support for torture because political leaders they agreed with have
expressed such support, and they are willing to accept it because it comports
with the "authority" aspect of their political identity. That commitment may
not yet be deeply entrenched; it may be set aside if Republican political
leaders express no support for torture as a component of partisan identity.
But that commitment may also be further solidified if prosecutions or pro-
fessional sanctions indeed take place. What was a temporary emphasis on
"authority" over "respect for human rights" might become a more perma-
nent part of partisan identification if, over the next few years, people are
asked to reflect on those choices and thereby reinforce their acceptance of
torture and detainee abuse.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the entrenched divide, is it possible to move forward with a
process to seek accountability? Perhaps. Some have suggested that prosecu-
tions are important for restoring the national anti-torture identity; that such
accountability is not about the individuals themselves, but would instead
59 See Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Naive Cynicism: Maintaining False Perceptions in
Poliq Debates, 57 EMORY L.J. 499, 518-19 (2008) ("Because we perceive ourselves to be
objective, we have little reason to think critically about whether our beliefs are, in fact, cor-
rect .... [O]ur biased theories, beliefs, and expectations, tend to persevere.").
60 See Cynthia McPerson Frantz, I AM Being Fair: The Bias Blind Spot as a Stumbling
Block to Seeing Both Sides, 28 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 157, 161 (2006).
61 Id.
62 Id. at 166.
63 Id.
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provide a "social statement" that these actions will not be tolerated. 64 What
is not clear, however, is whether the partisan divide on torture has become
too great to quickly re-create a national identity that condemns such acts.65
One possible way to move forward is through a truly bipartisan
commission. If indeed the two parties can come together to agree on the
interrogation techniques legally authorized under U.S. law, the techniques
actually used, and who should be held responsible, such a "social statement"
may be possible. Even if the parties disagree about the ultimate limits of
torture, they may be able to find some common ground in the middle to
condemn at least the most extreme cases. This is a difficult proposition,
however: given the current breakdown on partisan lines, it will not be easy
to get Republican involvement in such an investigation. And if a bipartisan
commission can be created, there is also a risk that the final findings will
break down on partisan lines, thus further entrenching the current divide
over torture. 
66
In the end, it may simply be that more time is needed to change the
cultural meanings associated with partisan identity. If a diminished military
presence allows torture to fade into the background, it will become a less
salient aspect of political culture. Conversely, an anti-torture meaning might
begin to grow out of other sources of shared identities such as religious in-
stitutions: human rights advocates have suggested that a uniform religious
response condemning torture from "the country's churches, synagogues,
and mosques" might create a stronger religious identity condemning tor-
ture.6 7 With enough time and distance, the cultural meaning may again shift
to allow a united American identity that condemns torture. Until that time,
64 Video: Marieke Wierda, Prosecuting Abuses Resulting From U.S. Counter-terror Poli-
cy, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7qGzA X5bO4 (last visited Nov. 4, 2009).
65 In the long run, successful prosecutions might indeed help restore a national consensus.
As other scholars have noted, court decisions themselves can play a role in conferring politi-
cal legitimacy. See, e.g., Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy, in THE
DEMOCRACY SOURCEBOOK 251 (Robert A. Dahl et al. eds., 2003) ("[A]t its best the Court
operates to confer legitimacy, not simply on the particular and parochial policies of the do-
minant political alliance, but upon the basic patterns of behavior required for the operation of
a democracy."). However, such influence takes time to permeate society, and, in any case,
requires a favorable court decision that withstands appeal to the Supreme Court.
66 While avoiding accountability efforts may avoid entrenching the partisan divide over
torture, it also risks creating a moral hazard problem: someone seeking to evade prosecution
may deliberately stoke the fires of partisanship in order to ensure that the prosecution would
be viewed as politically illegitimate. The more politically powerful the individual, the more
likely that such strategies would be successful. Whether the harm caused by a wrongdoer
avoiding justice weighs more than the harm resulting from partisan entrenchment is a politi-
cal, legal, and moral question that must be examined in each case.
67 SHADI MOKHTARI, AFTER ABU GHRAIB: EXPLORING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICAN AND
THE MIDDLE EAST 209 (2009).
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however, it is likely that accountability efforts will further entrench partisan
animosity.
